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The Extension of International Law to 
Private Parties Within the European Union 
INTRODUCTION 
During the twentieth century, one of the significant developments 
in European law has been the extension of international law to private 
parties.1 Today, private parties are more likely to have the public acts 
of sovereign parties reviewed in national and international legal sys-
tems.2 Suits for violations of international law3 and human rights4 
demonstrate that a foreign sovereign is no longer absolutely immune 
from suit in national5 and international courts.6 
The extension of international law to private individuals in Europe 
has been facilitated by two methods: "community competence" and 
"intergovernmental cooperation."7 This Note addresses the extension 
of international law to private parties in Europe. Part I examines 
"community competence" through the decisions of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). Part II examines "intergovernmental cooperation" through 
the right of Union Citizenship conferred by the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU). Part III compares "community competence" to "inter-
1 See Ronald A. Brand, The Role of International Law in the TwentyFirst Century: External 
Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 1685, 1692 (1995). 
2 See id.; 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 21-0055 (Sweet & Maxwell ed. 1996). 
The European Convention on Human Rights granted a right of petition to individual complain-
ants. See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 21-0055 (Sweet & Maxwell ed. 1996). 
~See Brand, supra note 1, at 1692. 
4 See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rptr. 277, to be published as 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) Application No. 16798/90 (Judgment of Dec. 9, 1994). The European Court of Human 
Rights ruled unanimously in Lopez. Ostra that Spain's complacent enforcement of environmental 
laws violated a family's right of privacy. See id. 
5 See Brand, supra note 1, at 1692. 
6 See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rptr. 277. 
7 See David O'Keeffe, General Course in European Community Law the Individual and European 
Law, in \'-1 CoLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 55, 84 (Academy of 
European Law ed. 1996). "Community competence" refers to limitations on state sovereignty 
imposed by the transfer of national control over certain issues to an international organization. 
See id. at 87. "Intergovernmental cooperation" refers to the cooperation resulting from the 
retention of complete control over national issues. See id. at 85. 
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governmental cooperation" from the standpoint of the individual. This 
Note concludes that "community competence" ultimately provides a 
better guarantee than "intergovernmental cooperation" for the protec-
tion of individual rights. 
I. THE EXTENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO INDIVIDUALS 
THROUGH "COMMUNITY COMPETENCE" 
A. The Individual As a Suf1ect of European Community Law 
The ECJ is the institution responsible for the extension of European 
Community (EC) law to individuals. 8 Through the doctrines of suprem-
acy and direct effect, the court's case law established the place of the 
individual in the EC's legal order.9 In Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ 
resolved the question of whether Article 12 of the EEC Treaty10 had 
direct application in national courts. 11 The court concluded that: 
[T] he Community constitutes a new legal order of interna-
tional law, for the benefit of which the states have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also 
their nationals .... Community law ... not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon 
them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These 
rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the 
Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty 
imposes in a clearly defined (direct effect) way upon individu-
als as well as upon the Member States .... 12 
8 See id. at 64. There is still a distinction between the EC and the European Union (EU). See 
TREATY ON EuROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. E., 31 I.L.M. 247, 256 [hereinafter TEU]. Article 
A of the TEU states that the Union is founded upon the EC. See TEU, art. A. Article M provides 
that nothing in the TEU shall affect the treaties that established the EC. See TEU, art. M. Thus, 
the ECJ's case law has not been superseded by the TEU. See id. 
9 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 64. Supremacy refers to the preemption of national law by EC 
law. See id. at 65. Direct effect refers to rights that are expressly granted by the European 
Economic Community (EEC) Treaty and to rights that arise from obligations which the treaty 
imposes upon member nations. See id. at 65-66. 
10 TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EuROPEAN EcoNOMIC CoMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. 
11 See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport- En Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos 
v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 3, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105 (1963). 
12 !d. at 12. 
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Thus, Member State nationals were able to lay claim to rights, on the 
basis of Article 12 of the EEC Treaty, which national courts had to 
protect.13 In Costa, the ECJ noted that the EEC Treaty's self-executing 
provisions created a body of law that bound Member States.14 Further-
more, Amministrazione delle Fiananze dello Stato v. Simmenthal explicitly 
resolved any question regarding the duty of national courts in the event 
of a direct conflict between EC and national law.15 The ECJ stated: 
The effectiveness of provisions of Community law which have 
direct effect ... cannot be impaired by incompatible national 
provisions whether they were adopted earlier or later. The 
fact that a constitutional court may declare such a national 
law to be unconstitutional cannot be allowed to prevent the 
national court from applying directly applicable provisions of 
Community law, even if the conflicting national provisions 
have not yet been declared unconstitutional. 16 
The ECJ's early view of the EC legal order evolved into a perception 
of the EEC Treaty as a constitutional documentP In Opinion 1/91, 
the court summarized its case law: 
[T]he EEC Treaty ... constitutes the constitutional charter 
of a Community .... The essential characteristics of the 
Community legal order which has thus been established are 
in particular its primacy over the law of the Member States, 
and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are 
applicable to their nationals and to the Member States .... 18 
Since the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect were the most 
important characteristics of EC law, this provided a guarantee for the 
enforcement of individual rights.19 
uSee O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 65. 
14 See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 603, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425 (1964). 
15 See Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Fiananze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, S.p.A., 1978 
E.C.R. 629, 656, [1978] C.M.L.R. 263 (1978). 
16Jd. 
17 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 69. 
18Jd. 
19 See id. 
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B. judicial Protection of the Individual 
The ECJ's protection of the individual has evolved into a rights- and 
remedy-based case law. 20 This generation of case law pertains to the 
. relationship between national law and EC directives in the enforce-
ment of EC legal rights.21 The ECJ has utilized the doctrine of direct 
effect in two distinct ways to protect individual rights.22 The court has 
( 1) relied on the direct effect of EC directives to protect individual 
rights23 and (2) interpreted Article 5 of the EEC Treaty as imposing 
obligations upon national courts to give effect to EC directives. 24 
The court's acceptance of the doctrine of direct effect of directives 
extended far beyond the wording of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty. 25 
In Van Duyn, the ECJ held that "the useful effect (of a Community 
directive) would be weakened if individuals were prevented from rely-
ing on it before their national courts .... "26 Using the Van Duyn 
reasoning, the court in Becker allowed an individual to rely on directives 
which had not yet been implemented by Member States.27 
In von Colson, the ECJ indicated another avenue for the protection 
of individual rights.28 The court determined that Article 5 of the EEC 
Treaty imposed an obligation on national courts to interpret national 
law, specifically introduced to implement an EC directive, in a manner 
which would give effect to the purpose of that directive. 29 Furthermore, 
in Faccini Dori, the court stated that EC law required Member States 
to make restitution to individuals for failure to transpose an EC direc-
tive into nationallaw.30 Thus, the doctrine of direct effect of EC direc-
20 See id. at 75. 
2! See id. This generation of case law is based on the assumption that national rules will apply 
in the resolution of disputes founded in EC law. See id. 
22 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 76-77. 
25 See id. at 76. 
24 See id. at 77. 
25 See id. at 76. Article 189 of the EEC Treaty requires that the result of an EC directive be 
binding upon each Member State to which it is addressed. See EEC TREATY, art. 189. Article 
189 leaves national authorities discretion in the manner in which national laws implement EC 
directives. See id. 
26 See Case 41/74, \Vonne van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, 1347, [1975] C.M.L.R. 
1 (1975). 
27 See Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v. Finaznzamt Munster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53, 77, [1982] 
C.M.L.R. 499 (1982). 
28 See Case 14/83, Sabine Von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 
E.C.R. 1891, 1909, [1986] C.M.L.R. 430 (1986). 
29 See id. 
50 See Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb Sri, [1995] C.M.L.R. 655, 691-92 (1995). The court 
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tives is complemented by the requirement of conformity of national 
laws with the purposes of EC directives and by the principle of state 
liability. 
C. Human Rights and the Individual 
"Community competence" in the area of human rights has extended 
international law to private parties.31 The European Convention on 
Human Rights (Convention) created its own judicial enforcement sys-
tem and granted a right of access to individual complainants.32 From 
the standpoint of the individual, this is significant because the case law 
of the ECHR is universally regarded as relevant to litigation practice.33 
The scope of human rights protected by the Convention is broad.34 
For example, the ECHR in Lopez Ostra unanimously ruled that the 
operation of a waste and water treatment station near the home of the 
plaintiff was a nuisance that constituted a violation of the right to 
private life under Article 8 of the Convention.35 The ECHR awarded 
said that a Member State will only be liable if the preconditions for state liability were met. See 
id. 
31 See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 2, at 21-0055. 
32 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened fur signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. 222,236 [hereinafter Convention]. Under 
Article 25 of the Convention, individuals and nongovernmental organizations may submit peti-
tions to the European Commission of Human Rights. See id. Upon receipt of a petition, the 
Commission reviews it for admissibility in accordance with the conditions set by Article 26 
(exhaustion of local remedies) and Article 27 (reasons for nonadmissibility are anonymous 
petitions, petitions submitted to another international procedure, no apparent violation of a 
protected right, and abuse of the right to petition). See id. at art. 26. If the petition is accepted, 
the Commission will ascertain the facts and will attempt to resolve the dispute. See id. at art. 28. 
If the matter remains unresolved, the Commission prepares a report containing a statement of 
facts and an opinion of whether a contracting party has breached its obligations under the 
Convention. See Convention, supra, art. 31. The report is then transmitted to the Committee of 
Ministers. See id. If the question is not referred to the Court by the Commission or a contracting 
state, the Committee decides whether the Convention has been violated. See id. at art. 32. 
33 See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 2, at 21-0056. For example, 
the Convention rights are directly effective in the domestic law of the Netherlands and Belgium 
and are pleadable before their national courts. See id. Although the United Kingdom has not 
implemented the Convention into its domestic legal system, courts are willing to hear "convention 
points" and to attach a level of credence to them. See id. 
34 See Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 89AM.J. INT'L L. 263,270-77 (1995). The term Human Rights encompasses: the 
right to life, the right to physical integrity and health, and the prohibition of degrading treatment. 
See id. 
35 See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rptr. 277. Since a leather tanning firm began 
operation in July 1988, odors from the treatment of waste and wastewater created health problems 
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Lopez Ostra 5.2 million pesetas in damages.36 Spain does not possess 
a right of appeal against this judgment.37 Thus, "community compe-
tence" in the area of human rights is another avenue by which indi-
viduals can use international law to enforce their rights. 
II. THE EXTENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO INDIVIDUALS 
THROUGH "INTERGOVERNMENTAL CooPERATION" 
The Third Pillar of the TEU is based on a form of "intergovernmen-
tal cooperation" that has strong links to the EC.38 The choice of "inter-
governmental cooperation" in the area of justice and Home Affairs was 
deliberate.39 It not only allows Member States to cooperate in areas 
which have been deemed to be important but also maintains control 
of internal decisionmaking in these areas.40 Consequently, the Third 
Pillar of the TEU lacks a generalized system of judicial reviewY Article 
L excludes the ECJ's jurisdiction over Third Pillar issues.42 This review 
is only available under Article K3(2)(c) for Third Pillar conventions43 
and under Article K9 in the event of a transfer of Third Pillar issues 
to the EC.44 
and nuisances for numerous people living in the area. See id. Ms. Lopez Ostra suffered health 
problems and felt her quality of life had diminished. See id. She launched legal action through 
regional and national courts, alleging "[u]nlawful interference with her home and her peaceful 
enjoyment of it, a violation of her right to choose freely her place of residence, attacks on her 
physical and psychological integrity, and infringements of her liberty and her safety on account 
of the municipal authorities' passive attitude to the nuisance .... " See id. Mter her final appeal 
was rejected, Ms. Lopez Ostra took her case to the European Commission on Human Rights in 
May 1990. See id. 
36 See Spanish Woman Wins Environmental Nuisance Case Under Human Rights Convention, 
Information Access Co., jan. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Allnews File. 
37 See id. 
38 See Dr. Dieter Kugelmann, The Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federal State, 
8 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 335, 339 (1994). The EU is founded on the treaties that comprise 
the EC: the EEC Treaty, the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and 
the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Commission. See TEU, supra note 8, 31 
I.L.M. at 247. The EU is built on three pillars. See Kugelmann, supra at 339. The First Pillar 
consists of the treaties that established the EC. See id. The Second Pillar is based upon a common 
foreign and security policy, and the Third Pillar consists of a combination of home affairs and 
judicial cooperation. See id. The latter two pillars are intergovernmental in nature. See id. 
39 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 85. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 90. 
42 See TEU, supra note 8, art. L. 
43 See id. at art. K3(2)( c). Third Pillar conventions concluded under Article K3 (2)( c) specifically 
stipulate that the ECJ may have jurisdiction to interpret their provisions and to rule on any 
disputes regarding their application, in accordance with the respective provisions of each con-
vention. See id. 
44 See id. at art. K9. 
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The form of "intergovernmental cooperation" adopted by the TEU 
extended international law to individuals by establishing a right of 
Union citizenship for every person who was a national of a Member 
State.45 The Treaty established a political link between the individual 
citizen and the Union.46 Union citizens are first and foremost nationals 
of Member States.47 The Treaty only confers citizenship of an interna-
tional organization to Member State nationals.48 Thus, Union citizen-
ship is a label for a collection of rights that exist under EC law.49 
III. "COMMUNITY COMPETENCE" COMPARED TO 
"INTERGOVERNMENTAL CooPERATION" 
From the standpoint of the individual, "community competence" 
provides a guarantee for the enforcement of individual EC-based 
rights.50 The EEC Treaty was more than an agreement which created 
mutual obligations between contracting states.51 This premise is sup-
ported by several factors.52 First, the preamble to the Treaty refers not 
only to governments but also to peoples. 53 Second, the Treaty establish-
ed institutions endowed with sovereign rights; the exercise of these 
rights affected not only Member States but also their citizens.54 Third, 
Member State nationals cooperate in the functioning of the EC 
through the intermediary of the European Parliament and the Social 
Committee.55 Fourth, the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 
177 confirmed that Member States acknowledged that EC law has an 
authority which can be invoked by their nationals before national 
courts and tribunals. 56 Thus, Van Gend en Loos was significant because 
it allowed individuals to rely on Treaty articles which satisfied the 
decision's direct effect test.57 
45 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 124. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. at 125. 
46 See id. at 124. 
49 See Kuge1mann, supra note 38, at 348. Some of these rights include: freedom of movement, 
freedom of residence, the right to address petitions, the right to vote and to stand as a candidate 
in municipal and European elections in the state where a person resided. See id. 
50 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 84. 
5! See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12. 
57 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 66. 
226 BoSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
The Van Gend en Loos decision would have had minimal significance 
if Member States had been permitted to give priority to subsequently 
enacted nationallaw.58 Individual EC law rights would have been de-
feated, and uniformity of result could not have been guaranteed.59 
Costa established the priority of EC law over nationallaw.60 This was 
the logical consequence of Van Gend en Loos and ensured effective 
judicial protection of EC rights.61 
Simmenthal provided further protection of EC rights. 62 This decision 
imposed upon national judges an obligation to disregard national law 
and to apply EC law.63 The ECJ arrived at this conclusion by basing its 
decision on a concept of rights pertaining to the individual. 64 The court 
held that EC law is "a direct source of rights and duties for all those 
affected thereby, whether Member States or individuals, who are par-
ties to legal relations under Community law"65 and that national courts 
were bound, as a result, "to protect ... the rights ... conferred upon 
individuals by Community law."66 Thus, the imposition of this obliga-
tion transposes the EC legal order to Member States and their courts, 
potentially disrupting constitutional precepts and judicial organiza-
tion.67 
The elevation of the EEC Treaty to the status of a constitutional 
document provides a guarantee for the enforcement of EC rights.68 
The ECJ's summary of its case law in Opinion 1/91 identified the 
doctrines of supremacy and direct effect as the most important char-
acteristics of EC law.69 The identification of these two doctrines pro-
vides a guarantee for the enforcement of individual rights.70 
The area of human rights affords many opportunities for judicial 
enforcement of individual rights. From the standpoint of the individ-
ual, Lopez Ostra is significant because it was the first time in the forty-
four years since the Convention was established that an environmental 
58 See id. at 67. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 68. 
63 See Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. at 656. 
64 See id. 
65 ld. at 642. 
66Jd. 
67 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 68. 
68 See id. at 69-70. 
69 See id. at 69. 
70 See id. at 69-70. 
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pollution complaint had been successfully pursued under Article 8.71 
The claim of environmental damage was successfully translated into a 
protected human right by Ms. Lopez Ostra. 72 Thus, this case may have 
precedential value for those individuals who can translate a harm into 
a protected human right.73 
The form of "intergovernmental cooperation" adopted by the TEU 
does not provide a guarantee for the enforcement of individual 
rights. 74 This is particularly true in terms of effective parliamentary and 
judicial supervision.75 The choice of "intergovernmental cooperation" 
was deliberate. 76 1t allowed Member States to cooperate in areas which 
were deemed to be important and where cooperation was desirable in 
light of internal markets.77 Thus, this cooperation allowed Member 
States to maintain their monopoly of decisionmaking in these areas. 78 
A generalized system of judicial review of Third Pillar issues is lack-
ing in the EU.79 If competence of these issues were transferred from 
Member States to the EC, then the ECJ would have jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes according to its case law.80 Provisions which were suf-
ficiently clear, precise, and unconditional could have given rise to 
rights not only for Member States but also for individuals.81 Because 
the ECJ and national courts would have been required to protect those 
rights, this would have enabled individuals to seek judicial enforce-
ment of their Third Pillar rights.82 
The form of "intergovernmental cooperation" adopted by the TEU 
can potentially lead to inconsistent enforcement of Third Pillar rights 
among states that are part of the EU.83 For example, a monist state 
could construe the Third Pillar as giving rights which individuals may 
enforce before national courts.84 On the other hand, a dualist state 
71 See European Court of Human Rights Finds Violation in Siting of Treatment Plant, 17 Int'l Envtl. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1043 (Dec. 14, 1994). 
72 See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rptr. 277. 
73 See Court Deems Pollution Infringes Human Rights, Information Access Co., Dec. 28, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Allnews File. 
74 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 84. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. at 85. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See Kugelmann, supra note 38, at 345. 
80 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 90. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. 
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would require that Third Pillar issues be enacted into law before they 
could be enforced before national courts. 85 Thus, some Third Pillar 
issues might not be brought before these national courts.86 
CONCLUSION 
One of the recent developments in European law has been the 
extension of international law to private parties. The separate legal 
enforcement system of the EC affords the private party an opportunity 
to seek judicial enforcement of EC rights. Likewise, the separate legal 
system of the European Convention on Human Rights affords an 
opportunity for individuals to seek judicial review of human rights vio-
lations. The method of "intergovernmental cooperation" established 
by the Third Pillar of the TEU represents a departure from this prece-
dent. The ECJ does not have jurisdiction over Third Pillar issues. Thus, 
a generalized system of review of these issues is lacking within the EU. 
This could potentially lead to inconsistent enforcement of Third Pillar 
rights. 
Thomas O'Leary 
INT'L L. 310, 314 (1992). According to monist theory, international treaties have primacy over 
municipal law in both international and municipal decisions. See id. 
85 See id. at 315. According to dualist theory, international treaties are part of a legal system 
that is separate from domestic law. See id. For an international treaty to operate as a rule of law 
in the domestic system of a dualist state, the government must incorporate the treaty into its 
domestic law. See id. 
86 See O'Keeffe, supra note 7, at 91. 
